



POSTAL DIGITAL CHANNELS RESEARCH

Cultivating the Postal Service's Digital Channels

The largest audience in American shipping, the thinnest commercial layer on it, and the lawful ways to close that gap: a benchmark of fifteen foreign posts and the domestic field.

Prepared in the structure and editorial conventions of the USPS OIG RISC white-paper series, in support of House Strategies Group's response to RFI 6HQOIG-26-A-0008.

13.9M

Daily visits to usps.com, 2025: roughly twice either national competitor

72.9M

Informed Delivery users, an asset only 22 percent of the world's posts have at any scale

\$0

Price of the interactive campaigns that served 45.1 billion impressions last year

9 of 11

Revenue opportunities that clear the legal screen; two screened out and named

About this document. A demonstration prepared by House Strategies Group, LLC to show what contractor-supported research for the OIG's forthcoming white paper can look like. Not a USPS OIG publication; not affiliated with, sponsored by, or endorsed by the U.S. Postal Service or its Office of Inspector General. Built entirely from cited public sources; no USPS, OIG, or nonpublic data appears.

PREPARED BY

House Strategies Group,
LLC
Tampa, FL · Washington,
DC

POINT OF CONTACT

Jelani House, Managing Director
jelani.house@housestrategiesgroup.com · (434)
981-5295

EVIDENCE BASE

usps-oig-digital.housestrategiesgroup.com
Every figure endnoted; capture date August
2026

Table of Contents

Executive Summary	2
Observations	4
Introduction	4
The Legal Perimeter of Digital Revenue	4
How the Postal Service's Digital Channels Compare Abroad	5
How the Channels Compare at Home	7
The Experience of Paying the Postal Service Online	9
Revenue Opportunities	10
Conclusion, and Questions This Paper Cannot Settle	12
Endnotes	14
Appendices	17
Appendix A: Objectives, Methodology, and Prior Coverage	17
Appendix B: Foreign Postal Operator Capability Matrix	18
Appendix C: Domestic Digital Capability Comparison	19
Appendix D: Sizing Illustrations and Assumptions	19

ABOUT THIS DOCUMENT

This is a demonstration white paper prepared by House Strategies Group, LLC in support of its response to USPS Office of Inspector General RFI 6HQOIG-26-A-0008. It is not a USPS OIG publication. It was built entirely from public sources, cited in the endnotes, and it deliberately follows the structure and editorial conventions of the OIG's RISC white-paper series so the Research directorate can judge how contractor-supported research would land in its own format. Findings are preliminary; under the contemplated engagement each would be verified, extended, and where research questions 1 through 3 apply, grounded in the Postal Service's internal data.

Executive Summary

The United States Postal Service operates the most visited digital front door in American shipping. Its website drew roughly 13.9 million visits a day in 2025, about twice the traffic of ups.com or fedex.com by independent measurement, and its mobile application is the highest rated of the three national carriers' apps.¹ Informed Delivery, which emails 63 million enrolled users a preview of their incoming mail each morning, reached 72.9 million total users in March 2025 and opens at rates most commercial senders never see.² No foreign post and no domestic competitor operates a consumer digital audience of this scale and habit.

That audience produces remarkably little revenue. The delivery-control features that UPS sells as a \$19.99 per year subscription and FedEx sells by the transaction are free at the Postal Service. Informed Delivery's interactive campaigns, which put 45.1 billion impressions in front of users in a single year, are offered to mailers at no charge; the Postal Service's own materials describe the channel as free marketing.³ In the third-party software where much of small-business postage is actually purchased, the Postal Service participates as an unbranded rate card, while UPS converted the same channel into a branded program it reports at more than \$4 billion in annual revenue.⁴ The defining fact of the Postal Service's digital position is the imbalance between audience and monetization rather than any shortage of audience.

What the Benchmarks Show

Fifteen foreign posts, examined against the Universal Postal Union's survey of 153 operators, point to which digital moves succeed and which fail, and suggest a single organizing test that predicts the difference: who pays. Consumer digital mailboxes collapsed in Germany, Canada, and Australia, and survived only where government made digital delivery mandatory (Denmark) or where the sender pays (Switzerland). Postal digital-identity ventures succeed when anchored to a national scheme, as in Italy and France, and die standalone, as Australia Post's Digital iD did in May 2026. Five posts sell postage as a handwritten code purchased in an app, at three different pricing postures: a 54 percent premium in Ireland, parity in Germany and the Netherlands, and a deliberate online discount in New Zealand. And across all fifteen, no post charges consumers for its app and none runs in-app advertising; digital revenue comes from product sales, paid service terms, sender-pays delivery, government reimbursement, and business-to-business identity fees.⁵

At home, the comparison set monetizes the digital relationship through at least eight distinct models: consumer subscriptions, per-transaction convenience fees, embedded wholesale channels, retail service attach, merchant-paid convenience, membership bundles, workflow software, and advertising. The Postal Service meaningfully uses one, the direct sale of postage and labels.

Where the Friction Is

A heuristic review of the tasks that produce revenue found the friction concentrated at exactly the moments money changes hands. Buying a label requires an account before prices are fully visible, while a free third-party site sells the same postage at deeper discounts with less effort. Filing a change of address online costs \$1.25 for card-based identity verification while the retail counter performs the task free, an inversion of normal channel economics that coexists with a lookalike-site industry charging movers up to \$89.95 for the same transaction.⁶ The mobile app that earned a 4.8 rating hands nearly every purchase off

to the website. Informed Delivery's growth is capped by its own enrollment gate, with national saturation at 34.7 percent of eligible delivery points.⁷

Where the Revenue Could Come From

The common assumption that the law forecloses new digital revenue does not survive contact with the statute. The Postal Regulatory Commission's mail-nexus doctrine, the market-test authority of 39 U.S.C. § 3641, and the Postal Service Reform Act's government-services provisions together cover the highest-value candidates identified in this paper: pricing Informed Delivery campaigns, a premium package-management tier, reclaiming the moving-related advertising the Postal Service once earned \$51.9 million a year from, and reimbursed digital government services in a statutory lane that contains, four years after enactment, zero agreements.⁸ The ideas that are genuinely blocked, commercial banking chief among them, are also the ones whose pilots failed on demand, and this paper says so with the record cited. Nine opportunities pass the legal screen; two are screened out and named.

This demonstration paper was built from public sources alone. Its usage and revenue figures are the public proxies; the Postal Service's internal channel data, which the OIG holds the standing to obtain, would replace every proxy and settle the questions public data cannot. That boundary is marked wherever it applies.

Observations

Introduction

The Postal Service enters its 251st year in a financial condition its own leadership describes as structurally imbalanced. The agency reported a \$9.0 billion net loss in fiscal year 2025 on \$80.5 billion in operating revenue, bringing aggregate losses since 2007 to roughly \$118 billion.⁹ First-Class Mail volume continues its long decline; package revenue grows but at contested margins; and the reforms already enacted, from pricing authority to retiree-health prefunding relief, have narrowed the gap without closing it. The incoming Postmaster General told stakeholders in November 2025 that occasional appearances of financial progress are outweighed by a significant systemic annual revenue and cost imbalance.¹⁰

Against that backdrop, the Postal Service's digital channels are a curiously under-examined asset. The OIG has studied the revenue potential of the physical network at length, most recently in its May 2026 examination of expanded government services at post offices.¹¹ The digital network has received no equivalent treatment, even though it is, by audience, the largest channel the Postal Service operates (see Box 1).

BOX 1: THE POSTAL SERVICE'S CONSUMER DIGITAL FOOTPRINT, FY 2025

13.9M

Daily visits to usps.com in 2025, per Postal Facts

72.9M

Informed Delivery users, March 2025, up 17 percent in a year

6M+

USPS Mobile app downloads in FY 2025

4.8

App Store rating across 1.7 million reviews, highest of the three national carriers

Source: HSG analysis of USPS Postal Facts, the Informed Delivery Year in Review (April 2024 to March 2025), and Apple App Store listings captured August 2026.

This paper examines the channels the Postal Service offers the general public and small businesses: usps.com, the USPS Mobile App, Informed Delivery and its companion app, and the postage services the Postal Service hosts directly, Click-N-Ship and Label Broker. Platforms built for commercial mailers and shippers, such as PostalPro, are outside its scope, as are the third-party websites that resell postage, although the latter appear here in their proper role as competitors for the digital relationship. The paper asks three of the six questions the OIG's research design poses: how these channels compare with those of foreign posts and domestic competitors, what the experience of completing revenue-generating tasks reveals, and where additional digital revenue could lawfully come from. The remaining questions, concerning usage trends, visit purposes, and ten years of channel revenue, can only be answered with internal data, and this paper marks that boundary where it applies rather than estimating around it.

The Legal Perimeter of Digital Revenue

Any serious discussion of new postal revenue has to begin with what the law permits, because the received wisdom, that the Postal Service is broadly forbidden from new lines of business, is only partly true and the part that is true is regularly misapplied. We brought the same assumption to this research; the Commission's own orders dispelled it.

The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 barred the Postal Service from offering new nonpostal services and grandfathered only those nonpostal services offered as of January 1, 2006 that survived a Postal Regulatory Commission review.¹² That review, completed in Orders No. 154 and 392, examined 47 revenue-producing activities and left standing a specific list, including passport photo services, licensed retail products, philatelic sales, website advertising arrangements, and the MoverSource program, which sold advertising around the change-of-address transaction and earned \$51.9 million in net income in fiscal year 2011.¹³ The D.C. Circuit upheld the Commission's central distinction: a service is nonpostal when it is a commercial offering to the public unconnected to the carriage of mail, and it is postal, and therefore permitted, when it is ancillary to collection, transmission, or delivery.¹⁴

Three consequences follow that matter for digital channels. First, digital features attached to delivery, tracking tiers, delivery-preference controls, redelivery and reroute options, postage sold in new forms, sit comfortably inside the postal definition; the Commission has said explicitly that it would be needlessly short-sighted to classify the electronic version of a recognized postal service as nonpostal.¹⁵ Second, the market-test authority of 39 U.S.C. § 3641 provides a tested route for pricing experiments: up to 24 months, revenue capped at \$10 million per year unless the Commission grants an exemption to \$50 million. Every Door Direct Mail entered as a market test and became a permanent product estimated at \$100 million in its first full year; USPS Connect Local repeated the pattern and converted to permanent status in 2024.¹⁶ Third, the Postal Service Reform Act of 2022 added a genuinely new lane: 39 U.S.C. §§ 3703 through 3705 authorize nonpostal services performed for federal, state, local, and tribal governments, for non-commercial purposes, at reimbursement of no less than 100 percent of attributable cost. As of the Postal Service's most recent reporting, no agreement under the state-local-tribal authority exists, and the OIG found in May 2026 that the organization has no formal strategy for the authority four years after it was granted.¹⁷

BOX 2: THREE LEGAL DOORS, ONE CLOSED CORRIDOR

Open: the postal-ancillary door. Features tied to delivery and postage need no new authority. Precedent runs from customized postage to electronic money transfer.

Open: the market-test door. Priced experiments up to \$50 million a year with Commission approval. The route EDDM took to permanence.

Open: the government-services door. Reimbursed, non-commercial services for any level of government under the 2022 Act. Empty since enactment.

Closed: new commercial nonpostal services to the public. Banking, general marketplaces, and open advertising networks would require legislation.

Source: HSG analysis of 39 U.S.C. §§ 404(e), 3641, 3703-3705; PRC Orders No. 154, 392, and 721; USPS v. PRC, 599 F.3d 705 (D.C. Cir. 2010).

How the Postal Service's Digital Channels Compare Abroad

The Universal Postal Union's most recent survey of 153 designated operators provides the base rates against which any single post's digital portfolio can be judged. Track and trace is nearly universal at 84 percent of posts. From there the provision rates fall quickly: 46 percent take online payment for postal services, 30 percent sell digital postage, 25 percent operate smart lockers, 22 percent offer an electronic mailbox of any kind, and 11 percent have issued crypto stamps.¹⁸ The fifteen posts examined for this

paper, selected for scale, comparability of universal service obligation, and digital reputation, sit near the top of those distributions, and even among them the patterns are uneven in instructive ways (see Appendix B for the full matrix).

The Postal Service already leads the category's rarest asset

Informed Delivery belongs to the 22 percent category, the electronic mailbox, and within it the Postal Service's position is singular. Germany's Deutsche Post offers envelope photographs of incoming letters through its app; PostNL offers a similar preview in the Netherlands; Austria delivers certified digital letters into its app. None approaches Informed Delivery's 72.9 million users, and none has its daily open habit: 13.8 billion digest emails sent in a year and 8.0 billion opened, an average open rate of 58.6 percent.¹⁹ The benchmark question this raises is not the usual one, whether the Postal Service has fallen behind foreign innovation. On this asset it is ahead, and the question is why the operator with the category's largest audience monetizes it least.

Consumer digital mailboxes fail without a mandate or a paying sender

The graveyard is well populated. Deutsche Post closed its E-POST consumer mailbox in November 2022 after two decades of investment. Canada Post shut epost the same year, after 23 years, and deleted its users' stored documents. Australia Post stripped its Digital Mailbox to a shell in 2017. The survivors follow two models. Denmark made digital government post mandatory for residents in 2014, with results so complete that the country's letter mail effectively ended, PostNord delivering Denmark's final letter on December 30, 2025. Switzerland's ePost charges the sender rather than the citizen, and delivered 4.5 million consignments digitally in 2025, up 60 percent in a year.²⁰ The lesson for any Informed Delivery evolution is direct: consumer-paid mailbox subscriptions have failed everywhere they were tried; sender-pays and government-anchored models are the ones still standing.

Digital postage codes are common abroad and absent at home

Five of the fifteen posts sell postage as a short code purchased in an app and handwritten on the envelope, no printer or label required: Deutsche Post's #PORTO, Swiss Post's DigitalStamp, PostNL's postzegelcode, An Post's Digital Stamp, and PostNord's Portokoder. The UPU puts digital stamp codes at 30 percent of posts worldwide. What makes the group analytically useful is that its members chose three different prices for the same convenience. An Post charges €2.85 against a €1.85 physical stamp, a 54 percent premium that Irish customers pay for skipping the shop. Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia price at parity. New Zealand Post runs the opposite strategy, pricing online redirection and hold services 30 percent below the counter to push transactions into the cheaper channel.²¹ The Postal Service, which has no equivalent product, has never had to choose a posture. The existence of three proven postures abroad means the choice, when made, can be evidence-based.

Identity is the highest-variance bet on the board

Poste Italiane operates roughly 28.7 million of Italy's 40 million SPID digital identities, about 72 percent of the national market, and begins charging users €6 per year for renewals in 2026. La Poste runs the only identity certified to the substantial assurance level for FranceConnect+, with 8.5 million users. Swiss Post's SwissID passed 3.8 million users and underpins services up to and including e-voting for Swiss cantons. Australia Post, holding no such anchor, discontinued its decade-old Digital iD effective May 1, 2026 and deleted the stored identity data.²² The pattern is consistent: postal identity ventures survive when the state designates the post as infrastructure for a national scheme, and fail as standalone commercial products. The domestic implication favors the reimbursed-services route, where Login.gov

in-person verification already operates at participating post offices in every state, over any freestanding commercial identity product.²³

BOX 3: A PAYER TEST FOR POSTAL DIGITAL SERVICES

Reading the fifteen operators together, the variable that best predicts whether a digital postal service survives is not the technology, the size of the post, or the sophistication of the design. It is the identity of the payer.

Every consumer-paid digital service in the sample either failed or never scaled. Germany, Canada, and Australia each built a digital mailbox that asked citizens to value it directly, and each shut it down. Meanwhile the services that persist are paid for by someone else in the transaction: senders (Swiss Post's ePost, Austrian dual delivery, Denmark's e-Boks), governments (Italy's Polis buildout, Swiss e-voting billed to cantons), banks and partners buying network access (Bank@Post), or businesses buying verification (POSTIDENT, SwissSign). Even the apparent counterexample proves the rule: An Post's digital stamp carries a 54 percent premium, but the customer is buying postage, an existing paid product, in a more convenient form. Nobody has successfully sold a citizen a new digital postal service on its own merits.

Applied to the Postal Service, the test produces an uncomfortable observation. Informed Delivery is the largest asset of its kind in the world and it currently has no payer at all. Consumers use it free, which the evidence above suggests is correct, and mailers receive its interactive campaigns free, which the evidence above suggests is a choice rather than a constraint. The question the white paper can usefully put to the Postal Service is not whether to monetize the channel but which side of it should carry the cost, and the international record answers that question more clearly than any domestic analogy does.

Source: HSG analysis of the fifteen-operator review; see Appendix B.

What no post does

Across all fifteen operators, two absences are total, and the second one surprised us. No post charges consumers a subscription for its mobile application, and no post sells third-party advertising inside its app or daily digest. Digital revenue abroad is earned instead through the sale of postal products in more convenient forms, paid service terms such as redirection and hold, sender-pays electronic delivery, fees charged to governments and banks for network access, business-to-business identity verification, and collectible premiums, with Austria's crypto stamps selling at €21.80 against face values under €2.²⁴ Only a minority of posts disclose a digital revenue line at all; La Poste's €1.6 billion in new digital services and Poste Italiane's payments segment, €1.67 billion in 2025 within a group deriving roughly 70 percent of revenue from non-mail activity, mark the observable ceiling of postal diversification.²⁵

How the Channels Compare at Home

The domestic comparison begins from a fact that surprises most readers, including this author: by audience, the Postal Service leads the category it is assumed to trail. Independent measurement in early 2026 put usps.com at roughly 493 million monthly visits, against approximately 228 million for fedex.com and 204 million for ups.com, ranking it first among shipping and logistics sites globally.²⁶ The USPS Mobile app's 4.8-star iOS rating across 1.7 million reviews leads UPS (4.6) and FedEx (4.6). The deficit sits downstream, in what happens to that attention next, and the comparison across five capability groups shows where (see Appendix C for the full table).

Delivery control: the competitors charge for what the Postal Service gives away

UPS My Choice offers alerts and delivery windows free, then gates confirmed two-hour windows and unlimited redirects behind a Premium tier reported at \$19.99 per year. FedEx Delivery Manager monetizes the same needs per transaction, with scheduled-delivery fees starting around \$5.55 a package. Amazon provides free photo proof of delivery, live driver maps, and day-of windows, monetized indirectly through the \$139-per-year Prime membership its delivery experience anchors.²⁷ The Postal Service's equivalents, hold mail, redelivery, Informed Delivery itself, are free, and its Premium Forwarding Service demonstrates that paid delivery control at USPS is neither novel nor forbidden. The delivery-preference moment, industry-wide, is a priced moment everywhere except usps.com.

The intermediary layer: the battle the Postal Service is losing without contesting it

A large share of small-business postage purchase happens away from usps.com, inside Pirate Ship, Shippo, ShipStation, Stamps.com, and the shipping tools embedded in eBay, Etsy, and Shopify. Pirate Ship charges nothing, passes through commercial pricing deeper than what Click-N-Ship exposed until 2024, and advertises \$705 million in cumulative shipper savings; it is, functionally, the casual shipper's USPS storefront. The economics of this layer changed in ways that should concern the Postal Service: EasyPost introduced a 3 percent fee on all USPS postage purchased through its platform effective June 2026, a tax on USPS volume collected by an intermediary.²⁸ UPS's answer to the same structural threat was the Digital Access Program, embedding UPS rates inside the intermediaries under UPS branding and revenue share; its chief financial officer reported the program grew from roughly \$150 million to more than \$4 billion in annual revenue by 2025.²⁹ The Postal Service supplies the rate card and carries the parcel in this channel while owning neither the customer relationship nor the data, and the contrast with UPS is the single largest structural monetization difference the domestic benchmark surfaces.

Returns, retail attach, and the experience bar

UPS acquired Happy Returns and scaled box-free, label-free returns with refund-at-scan to 10,000 locations by April 2026; Amazon operates a returns network of comparable size; FedEx routes returns through 17,000 OnSite locations in drugstores and dollar stores. The Postal Service's Label Broker is label-free but not box-free, and no refund-at-scan product exists, despite a retail network larger than any competitor's. Meanwhile FedEx Office and The UPS Store monetize the visit itself with passport photos, notarization (including FedEx's 24/7 online notary), and print services ordered online, a digital ordering layer the Postal Service's non-postal retail services lack.³⁰ Amazon's free photo-on-delivery and live tracking set the consumer expectation the Postal Service is measured against; the American Customer Satisfaction Index scores USPS shipping services at 72 against 77 for UPS, 79 for FedEx, and 81 for Amazon, and the Postal Service's own scorecard shows usps.com's customer-experience rating regressing in fiscal 2025 to 73.62 against a 76.95 target.³¹

Eight monetization models, one in use

Assembled, the domestic field monetizes digital relationships through eight recurring models: consumer subscription (UPS), per-transaction convenience fees (FedEx), embedded wholesale with revenue share (UPS again, at scale), retail service attach with digital front doors (UPS and FedEx), merchant-paid consumer convenience (Happy Returns, Amazon returns), membership bundles (Amazon), workflow software subscriptions (the Stamps.com and ShipStation families), and advertising against the shipping audience, still nascent everywhere. The Postal Service's digital revenue rests almost entirely on the first half of one model, direct product sales. The white paper's Task 2 conclusion writes itself from the table:

the gap is not a missing feature, it is seven missing business models, several of which are legally available today.

The Experience of Paying the Postal Service Online

The OIG's design for this topic asks for a broad heuristic review rather than usability testing, and the distinction matters: the purpose is to identify the characteristics that suppress completed purchases, scored against established evaluation frameworks rather than through observation of test users. The anchors used here are Nielsen's usability heuristics and the Baymard Institute's published checkout research, which puts average cart abandonment at 70.22 percent across 50 studies and attributes 18 percent of checkout abandonment to forced account creation and 40 percent to unexpected extra costs.³² Five findings from the preliminary review follow; each is documented from public sources and would be re-verified through complete task walkthroughs under the engagement.

A third party out-executes the Postal Service at selling its own product. The clearest single exhibit in the review is not on usps.com at all. Pirate Ship sells USPS postage free of subscription or markup, with commercial rates passed through and a flow simple enough to have become the default recommendation in casual-seller communities. To be fair, Click-N-Ship narrowed the rate gap in July 2024 when commercial pricing was extended to all users, but the workflow gaps sellers cite, a ten-label batch cap, no marketplace integrations, no automation, remain.³³ When the free competitor is better at the checkout than the owner of the product, the leak is the interface rather than the price; customer loyalty never enters into it.

The change-of-address flow taxes the cheap channel and subsidizes the expensive one.

Filing a change of address online requires a \$1.25 card-based identity-verification charge; the same transaction at a retail counter is free. The charge exists for fraud control, but the OIG's own audit found the underlying verification ineffective at stopping fraudulent address changes, with a \$21.8 million monetary impact, while a parallel industry of lookalike websites charged movers \$20 to \$89.95 and processed more than a million requests in a year.³⁴ The mover moment is thus triply mishandled: the official channel adds cost exactly where Baymard's research says abandonment starts, the fraud the fee was meant to stop persists, and the attention the moment generates is monetized by strangers instead of by the program that once earned the Postal Service \$51.9 million a year.

Informed Delivery's growth is capped by its own gate. Enrollment requires an eligible ZIP code and a uniquely coded mailbox address, a condition many apartment buildings fail; the Postal Service's guidance to those residents is to check back later. National saturation stood at 34.7 percent of eligible delivery points in March 2025.³⁵ Identity proofing, tightened after the pre-2019 knowledge-based system was exploited for fraud, adds a second gate whose failure rates are not published. Both gates bind the exact asset any advertising or premium-tier monetization would be built on, which makes measuring and widening them a revenue project as much as a customer-service one.

The best-rated app in the category cannot complete a sale. Recurring review themes for the USPS Mobile app, alongside its high rating for tracking, note that label purchase and most paid services bounce the user to the mobile website, that maintenance windows interrupt the daily habit, and that Informed Delivery previews do not always match the day's mail.³⁶ The app earned the audience and the rating, then routes every revenue moment through a second login on a different surface. Six million downloads in a single fiscal year monetize, in-app, essentially nothing.

Counterfeit pressure erodes trust in the channel being reviewed. OIG management alerts in October 2025 and April 2026, with recommendations valued at \$485.9 million and \$92.6 million, document counterfeit postage vulnerabilities running through online label channels.³⁷ Fraud hardening and friction reduction pull in opposite directions, and the review treats them together: each proposed control belongs in the same register as the conversion cost it imposes.

Revenue Opportunities

The opportunities below are screened, per the research design, against the Postal Service's character as a government agency: each carries the legal pathway it would travel, the precedent nearest to it, and an illustration of scale with assumptions stated. Two familiar candidates are screened out at the end, with reasons. Sizing illustrations use public baselines and are exactly that, illustrations; Appendix D states every assumption, and internal data would replace the public proxies wherever it exists.

Table 1: The Opportunity Register in Summary

Opportunity	Legal pathway	Nearest precedent	Illustrative scale
Price Informed Delivery interactive campaigns	Postal-ancillary; phase via market test	MoverSource advertising; website affiliate programs	\$90M to \$250M per year
Premium package-management tier	Postal-ancillary; market test	UPS My Choice Premium; USPS Premium Forwarding	~\$29M per year at 2 percent uptake
Reclaim the moving moment	Grandfathered umbrella (MoverSource)	MoverSource, \$51.9M net, FY 2011	\$30M to \$50M per year
Reimbursed government digital services	39 U.S.C. ch. 37; § 411	Login.gov in-person proofing, live today	Cost-covered network utilization
Unified small-business hub	No new authority required	EDDM's market-test-to-permanent path	Retention and share recapture
Digital stamp codes	Postal (postage prepayment)	Five foreign posts; three pricing postures	Demand protection plus option premium
Commercial tier on address APIs	Ancillary to address quality; market test	Lob at \$0.009 to \$0.05 per verification	Low tens of millions
Box-free returns with refund at scan	Postal (returns acceptance)	Happy Returns at 10,000 locations	Merchant-fee stream
Digital-twin collectible stamps	Grandfathered philately and licensing	Austria, Switzerland; UPU 95 percent stickiness	Single-digit millions
Postal banking (screened out)	Requires legislation	2021 pilot: six customers at four sites	n/a
Open advertising network (screened out)	Fails the postal definition	Affiliate precedent covers only mail-linked placements	n/a

Source: HSG analysis; statutory citations and sizing assumptions in Appendix D and the endnotes.

Price the channel currently described as free marketing

Informed Delivery's interactive campaigns put full-color, clickable creative in front of the daily digest's audience, and the Postal Service's own year-in-review materials describe the feature as a free marketing channel available at no additional cost. In the year ending March 2025 the platform recorded 45.1 billion impressions, over one million cumulative campaigns, and 18.7 million campaign clicks.³⁸ Advertising sold to mailers inside a mail-linked channel is the most conservative reading of the ancillary doctrine, with

MoverSource as direct precedent. Two pricing geometries bracket the illustration: at a \$2 effective CPM across current impressions, roughly \$90 million a year; at a \$250 average campaign fee across a million campaigns, roughly \$250 million, a figure that would require phasing through the market-test caps. The OIG's own 2021 research found marketers valued the channel for brand awareness but doubted measurable conversion, which argues for building the measurement first and the rate card second. Neither argues for leaving the price at zero.³⁹

Sell delivery control to the minority who will pay for it

A premium tier bundling confirmed delivery windows, unlimited redirects, and extended hold periods would sell a product the market has already validated twice, at UPS as a subscription and at FedEx as per-use fees. At 2 percent uptake among Informed Delivery's 72.9 million users and a \$20 annual price, the illustration yields roughly \$29 million a year; the uptake figure is a planning assumption, since no competitor publishes attach rates, and a market test would produce the real one.⁴⁰ The features are delivery-ancillary on their face, and the Postal Service already operates a paid delivery-control product in Premium Forwarding Service, so what would be new here is the packaging rather than the permission.

Reclaim the moving moment

The change-of-address transaction was once among the Postal Service's most successfully monetized digital moments, and the grandfathered MoverSource umbrella still stands. A modernized mover program would fix the inverted channel pricing, compete the lookalike sites out of their \$20-to-\$89.95 business by being findable and trustworthy, and restore sponsored placements around a transaction that marks the single most commercially significant life event a household reports to anyone. Restoring MoverSource-era net income, adjusted, suggests \$30 to \$50 million a year, before counting fraud-loss reduction the OIG has already quantified.⁴¹

Open the empty statutory lane

The 2022 Act's government-services authority is the rare case of white space created by statute and left untouched. The digital versions of the services the OIG's May 2026 paper explored physically, identity proofing with in-person fallback at post offices, electronic delivery of government correspondence with a print leg for the offline minority, agency service intake, are all non-commercial, reimbursable, and squarely inside the new sections. Denmark's experience shows the demand ceiling for government digital delivery; Login.gov's presence in post offices shows the on-ramp already paved. At cost-plus-nothing reimbursement the lane produces utilization rather than margin, roughly \$10 to \$15 million per million proofing events at reported federal rates, but it converts fixed network cost into funded activity and builds the identity asset every other digital opportunity compounds with.⁴²

The remainder of the register, briefly

A unified small-business hub, bundling Every Door Direct Mail, USPS Connect, Click-N-Ship Business, and campaign self-service behind one login, requires no new authority at all and answers the intermediary-layer problem with retention rather than rate cuts. Digital stamp codes import a product five benchmark posts already run, with Ireland proving a convenience premium is payable. A commercial tier on address-quality APIs, anchored to the ancillary address-management precedent, would price what commercial resellers such as Lob already charge up to five cents a lookup for. Box-free returns with refund at scan would put the largest retail network in the country into a product category UPS considered worth acquiring. Digital-twin collectible stamps ride the grandfathered philatelic umbrella into a market

where the UPU reports 95 percent of entrants keep issuing; Germany's tepid results temper the sizing honestly.⁴³

Screened out, and why

Candidly, postal banking fails both tests this paper applies. Legally, commercial financial services to the public fall outside the postal definition and the grandfather, and the 2022 Act's lanes are non-commercial by their terms. Empirically, the 2021 check-cashing pilot at four post offices attracted six customers in its first months, and Canada Post's lending venture with a major bank was paused within weeks of launch and discontinued in 2023.⁴⁴ An open advertising network on usps.com fails differently: the affiliate precedent covers mail-linked sponsored placements rather than general display inventory, and at prevailing display rates the revenue would be modest against a real cost in public trust. The white paper serves the Postal Service better by naming these plainly than by carrying them as filler options.

WHAT INTERNAL DATA WOULD ADD

Every figure above is a public proxy. The Postal Service's internal analytics hold the actuals this paper cannot see: ten years of channel-level revenue for research question 3 (no channel figure appears in any public filing; Click-N-Ship is not mentioned once in the FY 2025 Form 10-K), Click-N-Ship label volumes and customer counts, the Informed Delivery enrollment funnel and its identity-proofing failure rates, and campaign demand at nonzero prices. Under the engagement contemplated by the OIG's research design, each public proxy in this paper is replaced by the internal figure, and the sizing illustrations become estimates with confidence bands.

Conclusion

The Postal Service's digital channels present a problem that is rare in turnaround work, because the expensive part is already finished. The audience is assembled, the daily habit exists, the app is well liked, and the website out-draws every competitor in the category. What is missing is the commercial layer that every peer, foreign and domestic, has built on smaller audiences: priced convenience, sender-paid delivery, branded presence in the channels where customers actually buy, and reimbursed service to governments that already trust the network. The law, read carefully, permits most of what is worth attempting. The failures worth avoiding are documented, from Germany's mailbox to the check-cashing counter in the Bronx.

Questions this paper cannot settle

An honest demonstration should be as clear about its limits as its findings. Five questions matter more than anything argued above, and none can be answered from public sources alone.

- **What does the Postal Service actually earn per digital channel?** No public filing discloses it. Every sizing figure in this paper is a proxy standing in for a number the organization already knows.
- **Would mailers pay for Informed Delivery campaigns, and how many would leave?** The impression volume is published; the demand curve at any nonzero price is unknown, and the OIG's own 2021 research suggests marketers value the channel without being able to measure it.
- **Where does the enrollment funnel actually break?** Saturation sits at 34.7 percent of eligible delivery points. Whether the binding constraint is address eligibility, identity proofing, or awareness determines whether the fix is engineering, policy, or marketing.
- **Is the absence of agreements under the 2022 government-services authority a demand problem or a supply problem?** Four years of silence could mean state and local agencies do not

want the service, or that no one at the Postal Service has been assigned to sell it. The remedies differ entirely.

- **Does the payer test in Box 3 hold under scrutiny?** It is drawn from fifteen operators, which is enough to notice a pattern and not enough to prove one. A larger sample, or a single well-documented counterexample, would sharpen it considerably.

The work this research design contemplates is the work of turning those five questions into answers: verify the comparisons, measure the friction, size the opportunities against internal data, and give the Postal Service's leadership a ranked, lawful, evidence-backed set of choices. This demonstration shows the shape of that work and the standard we would hold it to. It does not pretend to have finished it.

Endnotes

1. Visits: USPS Postal Facts, "One Day in the Life of the Postal Service," 2025 (13.9 million daily usps.com visits), facts.usps.com/one-day. Comparative traffic: Semrush, Mail and Package Delivery category, March 2026 (usps.com ~493.0M monthly visits; fedex.com ~227.9M; ups.com ~204.3M); Similarweb category rankings, April 2026 (usps.com first among shipping and logistics sites globally). App rating: Apple App Store, USPS Mobile listing, captured August 5, 2026 (4.8 stars, 1.7M ratings), versus UPS (4.6) and FedEx Mobile (4.6).
2. USPS, Informed Delivery Year in Review, April 2024 to March 2025: 72.9M users (+17 percent year over year), 50.5M households, 63.1M email-enabled users, usps.com/business/pdf/informed-delivery-year-review.pdf.
3. Ibid., p. 15 (interactive campaigns described as a free marketing channel at no additional cost); 45.1B impressions; 13.8B Daily Digest emails sent and 8.0B opened (58.6 percent average open rate).
4. Digital Commerce 360, "UPS e-commerce strategy," March 10, 2026, reporting CFO Brian Dykes at the Raymond James Institutional Investors Conference (Digital Access Program above \$4 billion in 2025 revenue, from roughly \$150 million at launch).
5. Fifteen-post review conducted by HSG, August 2026, from operator sites, annual reports, and tariff pages; cross-post statistics from Universal Postal Union, "The Postal Sector's Role in the Digital Economy and Digital Society: A Global Panorama," 2025 (survey of 153 designated operators). Full matrix at Appendix B.
6. Fee: usps.com/manage/forward.htm (online change-of-address identity verification, \$1.25; in-person free). Lookalike sites: USPS OIG, "Issues Identified with Internet Change of Address," Report No. 22-058-R22, April 12, 2022 (third-party sites charging \$20 to \$89.95; over 1 million requests; \$21.8 million monetary impact).
7. Informed Delivery Year in Review (34.7 percent national saturation of eligible delivery points, March 2025); usps.com/manage/informed-delivery.htm (uniquely coded address requirement).
8. Grandfathered services and MoverSource income: GAO, "U.S. Postal Service: Additional Guidance Needed to Assess Effect of Nonpostal Products," GAO-13-216, January 2013, Appendix I. Empty statutory lane: 88 Fed. Reg. 36835 (June 6, 2023) (no agreements under 39 U.S.C. § 3703 as of USPS's FY 2022 report); USPS OIG, RISC-WP-26-001 (May 2026) (no formal strategy for the authority).
9. USPS FY 2025 Form 10-K (total operating revenue \$80,453 million; net loss \$9.0 billion), about.usps.com/what/financials/10k-reports/fy2025.pdf; aggregate losses since 2007 per the OIG's statement of work for this research design.
10. USPS news release, "U.S. Postal Service Reports Fiscal Year 2025 Results," November 14, 2025 (Postmaster General David Steiner).
11. USPS OIG, "Expanding Access to Government Services Through the Postal Network," Report No. RISC-WP-26-001, May 14, 2026 (nonpostal government services revenue of \$387 million in FY 2025, roughly 80 percent from passport processing).
12. Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, Pub. L. 109-435 (2006); 39 U.S.C. § 404(e); definition of postal service at 39 U.S.C. § 102(5).
13. Postal Regulatory Commission, Order No. 154 (December 19, 2008) and Order No. 392 (January 14, 2010), Docket No. MC2008-1; GAO-13-216, Appendix I (grandfathered list; MoverSource net income \$51.9 million, FY 2011).
14. U.S. Postal Service v. Postal Regulatory Commission, 599 F.3d 705 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
15. PRC analysis discussed in USPS OIG, "Like Products: A Look at Nonpostal Products and Services," Report No. RARC-WP-12-004 (2012), pp. 19-22 (ancillary factors; electronic money transfer determination).
16. 39 U.S.C. § 3641 (24-month duration; \$10 million cap, exemption to \$50 million); GAO-13-216, Appendix II (EDDM-Retail exceeding \$2 million per week by October 2012, estimated \$100 million in FY 2013, made permanent); 89 Fed. Reg. 82615 (October 11, 2024) (USPS Connect Local conversion to permanent product).
17. Postal Service Reform Act of 2022, Pub. L. 117-108, § 106, codified at 39 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3705; 88 Fed. Reg. 36835 (June 6, 2023); RISC-WP-26-001 (May 2026).
18. Universal Postal Union, Digital Panorama, 2025 edition (provision rates across 153 designated operators).
19. Informed Delivery Year in Review (users, digests, open rates); foreign mail-preview features per Deutsche Post (Briefankündigung), PostNL (Mijn Post), and Austrian Post (E-Brief) product pages, captured August 2026.
20. E-POST closure: Deutsche Post announcement, service ended November 30, 2022. epost closure: Canada Post, December 2022. Australia Post Digital Mailbox reduction, 2017 (trade press). Denmark: Digital Post mandatory for residents from November 1, 2014 (digst.dk); PostNord Denmark delivered the country's final letter December 30, 2025 and operates parcels-

only from 2026 (postnord.dk; international press). Swiss Post ePost: 1 million active mailboxes; 4.5 million consignments delivered digitally in 2025, up 60 percent (Swiss Post annual reporting).

21. Deutsche Post Mobile Briefmarke #PORTO (price parity with physical stamps); Swiss Post DigitalStamp; PostNL postzegelcode (covers 50 grams at the 20-gram physical price, 2026 tariffs); An Post Digital Stamp (€2.85 versus €1.85 physical, February 2026 tariffs); PostNord Portokoder (parity); New Zealand Post redirection and hold tariffs (30 percent online discount). Operator tariff pages, captured August 2026.
22. Poste Italiane: approximately 28.7 million of about 40 million SPID identities (roughly 72 percent), with €6-per-year renewal fees from 2026 (Italian trade and identity-industry press, 2025-2026). La Poste L'Identité Numérique: 8.5 million users; sole substantial-assurance identity for FranceConnect+ (franceconnect.gouv.fr). SwissID: more than 3.8 million users (Swiss Post). Australia Post Digital iD discontinuation effective May 1, 2026 (auspost.com.au).
23. Login.gov, "Verify your identity in person," login.gov/help (participating post offices in all 50 states and five territories).
24. Austrian Post Crypto stamp program (first blockchain stamp, June 2019; Crypto stamp art at €21.80, December 2024); Swiss Post Crypto Stamp (first edition sold out in about four hours, November 2021); UPU Digital Panorama (11 percent of posts; 95 percent continuation rate).
25. La Poste 2025 results (€1.6 billion, new digital services and local human services; Docaposte €878 million). Poste Italiane FY 2025 preliminary results (group revenue €13.1 billion; Postepay Services €1.67 billion; roughly 70 percent of group revenue from non-mail activity).
26. Semrush and Similarweb, cited at note 1.
27. UPS My Choice tiers (Premium reported at \$19.99 per year, corroborated across 2026 secondary sources; base features free). FedEx Delivery Manager (paid scheduled delivery from approximately \$5.55 per package, per published fee compilations). Amazon Prime, \$139 per year (2026); photo on delivery and live map standard.
28. Pirate Ship (no subscription or markup; \$705 million cumulative claimed savings; pirateship.com). EasyPost pricing change effective June 1, 2026 (3 percent fee on USPS postage; reported by competing platform Shippo).
29. Digital Commerce 360, March 10, 2026, cited at note 4; program history per UPS announcements from October 2019.
30. UPS press release, April 21, 2026 (Happy Returns at 10,000 U.S. locations; box-free, label-free, refund initiated at scan). FedEx OnSite (approximately 17,000 locations, 2024). FedEx Office online notary (24/7, with Proof/Notarize). USPS Label Broker, usps.com/ship/label-broker.htm.
31. American Customer Satisfaction Index, Retail and Consumer Shipping Study 2025 (January 2025). USPS FY 2025 Annual Report to Congress, corporate performance tables (usps.com customer-experience survey at 73.62 versus a 76.95 target; 75.53 in FY 2024).
32. Baymard Institute, cart abandonment research compilation (70.22 percent average across 50 studies; causes of checkout abandonment); Nielsen Norman Group, "10 Usability Heuristics for User Interface Design."
33. Commercial pricing extension to all enhanced Click-N-Ship users, July 2024, and seller-community reception (trade press and seller forums, 2023-2025).
34. USPS OIG, Report No. 22-058-R22, cited at note 6; U.S. Postal Inspection Service consumer alerts on change-of-address scams.
35. Informed Delivery Year in Review; usps.com Informed Delivery eligibility guidance.
36. Apple App Store listing and review themes, USPS Mobile, captured August 2026; USPS Postal Facts (6 million+ FY 2025 downloads).
37. USPS OIG, "Management Alert: Issues Identified with Counterfeit Postage," Report No. 25-072-1-R26, October 15, 2025 (recommendation valued at \$485,929,981); "Management Alert: Emerging Counterfeit Label Trend," Report No. 25-072-3-R26, April 8, 2026 (\$92,607,119).
38. Informed Delivery Year in Review (impressions, campaigns, clicks; the free-marketing description at p. 15).
39. USPS OIG, "Marketers' Perceptions of Informed Delivery and Informed Visibility," Report No. RISC-WP-21-005, June 8, 2021.
40. Baseline and price anchors at notes 2 and 27; the 2 percent uptake assumption is stated as a planning figure in Appendix D.
41. GAO-13-216, Appendix I (MoverSource); OIG Report No. 22-058-R22 (fraud impact and lookalike-site market).
42. 39 U.S.C. §§ 3703-3704 (100 percent attributable-cost reimbursement); Login.gov in-person verification, cited at note 23; reimbursement-rate illustration in Appendix D. Denmark's e-Boks: about 5.3 million Danish users, more than 90 percent of adults, sender-pays (e-boks.com; digst.dk).
43. EDDM and Connect Local at note 16; Lob address-verification pricing, lob.com/pricing (\$0.009 to \$0.05 per U.S. lookup by tier); An Post premium pricing at note 21; Happy Returns at note 30; UPU crypto-stamp continuation rate at note 24; German crypto-stamp demand (trade press, 2023-2024).

44. Check-cashing pilot: The American Prospect, March 11, 2022 (six customers across four pilot post offices as of January 12, 2022, per reporting on the program). Canada Post MyMoney Loan with TD: launched October 2022, paused November 2022, discontinued 2023 (CBC and company statements).

Appendices

Appendix A: Objectives, Methodology, and Prior Coverage

Objectives

This demonstration paper addresses three questions from the OIG's research design for its forthcoming white paper on Postal Service digital channels: how the channels compare with those of foreign postal operators and domestic competitors, including the ways each generates revenue; what the user experience of completing revenue-generating tasks reveals about barriers to purchase; and what opportunities exist to increase revenue through the channels, evaluated with the Postal Service's status as a government agency as a controlling constraint.

Methodology

All findings derive from public sources captured in August 2026: operator websites and tariff pages, annual reports and investor materials, Universal Postal Union research, USPS financial filings and Postal Facts, OIG and GAO reports, Postal Regulatory Commission orders, statute and case law, application-store listings, and published checkout-behavior research. Each benchmark entry records its source and capture date. Facts that could not be confirmed against a primary or corroborated source were either excluded or attributed as reported. The user-experience findings apply heuristic review anchored to Nielsen's usability heuristics and Baymard Institute checkout research; no usability testing was performed and none is proposed by the research design. Sizing figures are illustrations with assumptions stated in Appendix D, and they are illustrations rather than estimates; conversion to estimates requires the internal data noted in the body. The full evidence base, including the capability matrices in browsable form, is maintained at usps-oig-digital.housestrategiesgroup.com.

Prior Coverage

The OIG has examined adjacent questions across more than a decade; this paper is built to extend that line rather than restart it. Most relevant: *Expanding Access to Government Services Through the Postal Network* (RISC-WP-26-001, May 2026); *The Role of the Postal Service in Identity Verification* (RISC-WP-22-006, May 2022); *Marketers' Perceptions of Informed Delivery and Informed Visibility* (RISC-WP-21-005, June 2021); *Riding the Waves of Postal Digital Innovation* (RARC-WP-16-014, July 2016); *The Internet of Postal Things* (RARC-WP-15-013, 2015); *e-Government and the Postal Service* (RARC-WP-13-003, January 2013); *Digital Identity: Opportunities for the Postal Service* (RARC-WP-12-011, May 2012); *eMailbox and eLockbox* (RARC-WP-12-003, November 2011); and the *Postal Service Role in the Digital Age* series (RARC-WP-11-002 and -003, 2011). Audit coverage informing the friction findings includes Reports No. 22-058-R22 (internet change of address), 20-268-R21 (online refunds), 23-033-R23 (customer-experience surveys), and the counterfeit-postage management alerts of October 2025 and April 2026.

Appendix B: Foreign Postal Operator Capability Matrix

Operator	Digital stamp code	Mail preview	Digital mailbox	National identity role	Gov. services	Owned bank	Crypto stamps
Royal Mail (UK)	Partial	No	No	No	No	No	No
Deutsche Post DHL (DE)	Yes	Yes	Closed 2022	Partial	Partial	Divested	Yes
La Poste (FR)	Partial	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Australia Post	No	No	Closed 2017	Ended 5/2026	Yes	Agency only	No
Japan Post	Partial	No	No	Partial	Partial	Yes	No
Swiss Post	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Poste Italiane (IT)	Partial	No	No	Yes (72%)	Yes	Yes	No
PostNL (NL)	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Correos (ES)	No	No	Unverified	Partial	Partial	No	Yes
Canada Post	No	No	Closed 2022	Partial	Partial	Ended 2023	No
An Post (IE)	Yes (+54%)	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
PostNord (SE/DK)	Yes	No	Divested 2025	No	Partial	No	No
Singapore Post	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
New Zealand Post	No	No	No	Partial	Partial	Divested 2022	No
Austrian Post	Unverified	Partial	Yes	Partial	Yes	Yes	Yes (first, 2019)

Source: HSG review of operator sites, tariff pages, and annual reports, captured August 2026. "Partial" denotes a limited or adjacent offering; full per-cell sourcing is maintained in the browsable evidence base. USPS reference points: no digital stamp code; mail preview at unmatched scale (Informed Delivery); no consumer digital mailbox beyond preview; identity role emerging through Login.gov in-person proofing; government services under 39 U.S.C. ch. 37 unused; no owned bank; no crypto stamps.

Appendix C: Domestic Digital Capability Comparison

Capability	USPS	UPS	FedEx	Amazon	3P platforms
Consumer label purchase online	Yes	Yes	Yes	Sellers only	Yes, cheaper flow
Photo proof of delivery	No	Partial	Yes, free	Yes, standard	n/a
Delivery preferences and redirects	Free, partial	Paid tier, \$19.99/yr	Paid per use	Free, in app	n/a
Mail imaging / digital mailbox	Yes, 72.9M users	No	No	No	No
Box-free returns, refund at scan	No	Yes, 10,000 sites	Partial	Yes	Partial
Branded embedded-channel program	No (unbranded rates)	Yes, >\$4B (2025)	Yes (fdx)	Yes (Buy Shipping)	They are the channel
Consumer subscription revenue	No	Yes	No (per-use)	Yes (\$139/yr bundle)	SaaS tiers
Retail services with digital ordering	No	Yes	Yes, incl. online notary	No	No

Source: HSG review of company product pages, press releases, and published pricing, captured August 2026. Full fifteen-capability version with per-cell notes in the browsable evidence base.

Appendix D: Sizing Illustrations and Assumptions

Illustration	Formula	Assumptions and their status
Campaign pricing, CPM basis: ~\$90M/yr	45.1B impressions × \$2.00 CPM	Impressions are USPS-published (Apr 2024 to Mar 2025). \$2 CPM is the low end of programmatic display norms; planning assumption.
Campaign pricing, fee basis: ~\$250M/yr	1.0M campaigns × \$250 average fee	Campaign count is USPS-published (cumulative through Mar 2025). Fee level and demand retention at nonzero prices are unknown; requires the market-test route and OIG-facilitated demand data.
Premium tier: ~\$29M/yr	72.9M users × 2% × \$20/yr	User base is USPS-published. Uptake is a planning assumption; no competitor publishes attach rates. Price anchored to UPS My Choice Premium.
Moving moment: \$30M to \$50M/yr	MoverSource FY 2011 net income, adjusted, plus recaptured lookalike-site fees	FY 2011 figure is GAO-reported. Adjustment and recapture rates are planning assumptions; current COA volumes conflict across public sources and require internal reconciliation.
Identity proofing: \$10M to \$15M per 1M events	Events × \$10 to \$15 reimbursement	Rate range reflects reported federal in-person proofing reimbursements; statutory floor is 100 percent of attributable cost, so this produces funded utilization rather than margin.

Source: HSG analysis. Every illustration converts to an estimate only with internal data; the paper marks that dependency rather than estimating around it.

Demonstration white paper prepared by House Strategies Group, LLC, August 2026, in support of its response to USPS OIG RFI 6HQOIG-26-A-0008. Not a USPS OIG publication. Point of contact: Jelani House, Managing Director, jelani.house@housestrategiesgroup.com, (434) 981-5295. Browsable evidence base: usps-oig-digital.housestrategiesgroup.com.